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Abstract
In a system of interdependent users, the security of an entity is affected not only
by that user’s investment in security measures, but also by the positive exter-
nality of the security decisions of (some of) the other users. The provision of
security in such system is therefore modeled as a public good provision problem,
and is referred to as a security game. In this paper, we compare two well-known
incentive mechanisms in this context for incentivizing optimal security invest-
ments among users, namely the Pivotal and the Externality mechanisms. The
taxes in a Pivotal mechanism are designed to ensure users’ voluntary partic-
ipation, while those in an Externality mechanism are devised to maintain a
balanced budget. We first show the more general result that, due to the non-
excludable nature of security, no mechanism can incentivize the socially optimal
investment profile, while at the same time ensuring voluntary participation and
maintaining a balanced budget for all instances of security games. To further
illustrate, we apply the Pivotal and Externality mechanisms to the special case
of weighted total effort interdependence models, and identify some of the effects
of varying interdependency between users on the budget deficit in the Pivotal
mechanism, as well as on the participation incentives in the Externality mech-
anism.
Keywords: Interdependent security games, Budget balance, Voluntary
participation, Mechanism design
1{naghizad, mingyan}@umich.edu
Preprint submitted to arXiv March 26, 2015
1. Introduction
The improved infrastructure and an increase in the adoption of cyber-technology
have led to increased connection and ease of interaction for users across the
globe. However, at the same time, these developments have increased users’
exposure to risk. The importance of investing in security measures in this de-
veloping landscape is two-fold: while such expenditure helps entities protect
their assets against security threats, by association it also benefits other inter-
acting users, as an investing entity is less likely to be infected and used as a
source of future attacks. In other words, a users’ expenditure in security in
an interconnected system provides positive externalities to other users. Conse-
quently, the provision of security is often studied as a problem of public good
provision. In particular, when users are rational, the strategic decision making
process leading to security investment decisions is studied as an (interdependent)
security game [1].
It is well-known that in an unregulated environment, the provision of public
goods is in general inefficient [2]. To eliminate this inefficiency, the literature has
proposed regulating mechanisms for implementing the socially optimal levels of
security in these games, see e.g. [1, 3, 4, 5]. Specifically, examples of existing
mechanisms in the literature include introducing subsidies and fines based on
security investments [6, 3], assessing rebates and penalties based on security
outcomes [3], imposing a level of due care and establishing liability rules [6, 7],
etc.
Our focus in the current paper is on mechanisms that use monetary pay-
ments/rewards to incentivize improved security behavior. Within this context,
we will examine two incentive mechanisms, namely the Pivotal [8] and Exter-
nality [9] mechanisms, both of which induce socially optimal user behavior by
levying a monetary tax on each user participating in the proposed mechanism.
Aside from inducing optimal behavior, incentive mechanisms are often de-
signed so as to maintain a (weakly) balanced budget (BB) and ensure voluntary
participation (VP) by all users. The budget balance requirement states that the
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designer of the mechanism prefers to redistribute users’ payments as rewards,
and ideally to either retain a surplus as profit or at least to not sustain losses.
Otherwise, the designer would need to spend external resources to achieve social
optimality.
The voluntary participation constraint on the other hand ensures that all
users voluntarily take part in the proposed mechanism and the induced game,
and prefer its outcome to that attained if they unilaterally decide to opt out
of the mechanism. A user’s decision when contemplating participation in an
incentive mechanism is dependent not only on the structure of the game induced
by the mechanism, but also on the options available when staying out. The latter
is what sets the study of incentive mechanisms for security games apart from
other public good problems where similar Pivotal and Externality mechanisms
have been applied, e.g., [10, 11].
To elaborate on this underlying difference, we note that security is a non-
excludable public good. That is, although the mechanism optimizes the invest-
ments in a way that participating users are exposed to lower risks, those who
stay out of the mechanism can benefit from the externalities of such improved
state of security as well. The availability of these spill-overs in turn limits users’
willingness to pay for the good or their interest in improving their actions. In
contrast, with excludable public goods, e.g. transmission power allocated in a
communication system [11], users’ willingness to participate is determined by
the change in their utilities when contributing and receiving the good, as com-
pared to receiving no allocation at all. This means that the designer has the
ability to collect more taxes and require a higher level of contribution when
providing an excludable good. As a result, tax-based mechanisms, such as the
Externality mechanism (e.g. [11]) and the Pivotal mechanism (e.g. [10]), can
be designed so as to incentivize the socially optimal provision of an excludable
good, guarantee voluntary participation, and maintain (weak) budget balance.
However, in this paper we show that given the non-excludable nature of
security, there is no reliable tax-based mechanism that can achieve social opti-
mality, voluntary participation, and (weak) budget balance simultaneously in all
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instances of security games. We show this result through two sets of counter-
examples: we first limit the network structure to a star topology, and then
consider the commonly studied weakest link model for users’ risk functions. We
then further elaborate on this particular nature of security games by examin-
ing the Pivotal and Externality mechanisms in the special case of a weighted
total effort interdependence model. This interdependence model is of particular
interest as it can capture varying degrees and possible asymmetries in the in-
fluence of users’ security decisions on one another. Specifically, we evaluate the
effects of: (i) increasing users’ self-dependence (equivalently, decreasing their
interdependence), (ii) having two diverse classes of self-dependent and reliant
users, and (iii) presence of a single dominant user, on the performance of the
Pivotal and Externality mechanisms. We show that when possible, the selec-
tion of equilibria that are less beneficial to the outliers helps the performance
of both mechanisms, so that they can achieve optimality, budget balance, and
voluntary participation simultaneously. In addition, we see that these incentive
mechanisms become of interest when they can facilitate a tax-transfer scheme,
such that users who are highly dependent on externalities pay to incentivize
improved investments by others who are key to improving the state of security.
The main findings of this work can therefore be summarized as follows. First,
we show that there is no tax-based incentive mechanism that can simultaneously
guarantee social optimality, voluntary participation, and weak budget balance
in all instances of security games. This result is applicable to other problems
concerning the provision of non-excludable public goods over social and eco-
nomic networks as well (see Section 5). Second, we provide further insight on
this impossibility by evaluating two incentive mechanisms, namely the Pivotal
and Externality mechanisms, in weighted total effort games. We identify some
of the parameters affecting the performance of these mechanisms, and instances
in which the implementation of each mechanism is of interest.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We present the model for
security games, as well as the Pivotal and Externality mechanisms, in Section
2, followed by the general impossibility result in Section 3. Section 4 illustrates
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this result by applying the Pivotal and Externality mechanisms to weighted
total effort models. We summarize related work in Section 5, and conclude in
Section 6.
2. Security games: Model and Preliminaries
2.1. Model
Consider a network of N interdependent users. Each user i can choose to
exert effort towards securing its system, consequently achieving the level of
security or level of investment xi ∈ R≥0. Let x := {x1, x2, . . . , xN} denote the
state of security of the system, i.e., the profile of security levels of all N users.
We let hi(·) : R≥0 → R≥0 denote the investment cost function of user i; it
determines the monetary expenditure required to implement a level of security
xi. We assume this function is continuous, increasing, and convex. The assump-
tion of convexity entails that security measures get increasingly costly as their
effectiveness increases.
The expected amount of assets user i has subject to loss, given the state of
security x, is determined by the risk function, and is denoted by fi(·) : R
N
≥0 →
R≥0. We assume fi(·) is continuous, non-increasing, and strictly convex, in all
arguments xj . The non-increasing nature of this function in arguments xj , j 6= i,
models the positive externality of users’ security decisions on one another. The
convexity on the other hand implies that the effectiveness of security measures
in preventing attacks (or the marginal utility) is overall decreasing, as none
of the available security measure can guarantee the prevention of all possible
attacks.
A user i’s (security) cost function at a state of security x is therefore given
by:
gi(x) = fi(x) + hi(xi) . (1)
We refer to the one-stage, full information game among the N utility max-
imizing users with utility functions ui(x) = −gi(x) as the security game. The
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level of investments in the Nash equilibrium of these games, and their sub-
optimality when compared to the socially optimal investments, has been exten-
sively studied in the literature, see e.g. [1, 5, 12]. Here, the socially optimal
investment levels x∗ are those maximizing the total welfare, or equivalently,
minimizing the sum of all users’ costs, i.e.,
x∗ = argmin
x0
∑
i
gi(x). (2)
The literature has further proposed mechanisms for decreasing the inefficiency
gap in security games, by either incentivizing or dictating improved security
investments; see [1] for a survey. Our focus in the present paper is on regulating
mechanisms that use monetary taxation to incentivize socially optimal security
behavior. Such mechanisms assess a tax ti on each user i; this tax may be
positive, negative, or zero, indicating payments, rewards, or no transaction,
respectively.
We further assume that users’ utilities are quasi-linear. Therefore, the total
cost of a user i when it is assigned a tax ti is given by:
gi(x, ti) := gi(x) + ti. (3)
In addition to implementing the socially optimal solution, incentive mecha-
nisms are often required to satisfy two desirable properties. First, when using
taxation, the mechanism designer prefers to maintain (weak) budget balance
(BB); i.e., it is desirable to have
∑
i ti ≥ 0. In particular,
∑
i ti < 0 implies a
budget deficit, such that the implementation of the mechanism would call for
the injection of additional resources by the designer.
In addition, it is desirable to design the mechanism in a way that users’ vol-
untary participation (VP) conditions are satisfied; i.e. users prefer implementing
the socially optimal outcome while being assigned taxes ti, to the outcome at-
tained had they unilaterally opted out. Otherwise, the designer would need to
enforce initial cooperation in the mechanism. Note that we focus on the notion
of voluntary participation instead of the usual individual rationality (IR) con-
straint, which requires a user to prefer participation to the outcome it attained
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at the state of anarchy (i.e., prior to the implementation of the mechanism).
As mentioned in Section 1, such distinction is important as security is a non-
excludable public good, i.e., users can still benefit from the externalities of the
actions of users participating in the mechanism, even when opting out them-
selves. This is in contrast to games with excludable public goods, where VP
and IR are equivalent.
We now proceed to introduce the Pivotal and Externality tax-based incentive
mechanisms for security games.
2.2. The Pivotal Mechanism
Groves mechanisms [2, 10], also commonly known as Vickery-Clarke-Groves
(VCG) mechanisms, refer to a family of mechanisms in which, through the
appropriate design of taxes for users with quasi-linear utilities, a mechanism de-
signer can incentivize users to reveal their true preferences in dominant strate-
gies, thus implementing the socially optimal solution. However, the (weak)
budget balance and voluntary participation conditions do not necessarily hold
in these mechanisms, and are further dependent on the specifics of the design,
as well as the game environment.
In general, let ui(k, θi, ti) = vi(k, θi) − ti be user i’s utility. Here, θi is
user i’s type; a user’s type determines the preference of the user over possible
outcomes. In security games, a user i’s type is its risk and investment cost
functions {fi(·), hi(·)}, or equivalently, its cost function gi(·). Users are required
to report their types to the mechanism designer, based on which the designer
decides on an allocation k. In security games, an allocation is the vector of
investments x prescribed by the mechanism.
The VCG family of mechanisms achieve truth revelation and efficiency by
assigning the following taxes to users, when their reported types are θˆ:
ti(θˆ) = αi(θˆ−i)−
∑
j 6=i
vj(k
∗(θˆ), θˆj) .
Here, k∗(θˆ) = argmaxk
∑
i vi(k, θˆi) is the socially optimal allocation given users’
reported types, and αi(·) is an arbitrary function that depends on the reported
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types of users other than i. Any choice of this function results in truth revelation
and a socially efficient outcome, and a careful design may further result in VP
and/or (W)BB.
One such choice that can achieve VP in certain environments is the Pivotal,
or Clarke, mechanism [8, 10], with taxes given by:
ti(θˆ) =
∑
j 6=i
vj(k
∗
−i(θˆ−i), θˆj)−
∑
j 6=i
vj(k
∗(θˆ), θˆj) .
Here, k∗−i(θˆ−i) = argmaxk
∑
j 6=i vj(k, θˆj), is the outcome maximizing the social
welfare in the absence of user i. This mechanism satisfies the participation
constraints and achieves weak budget balance in many private and public good
games [10]; however, this is not necessarily the case in security games.
The taxes in the Pivotal mechanism for the security game can be set as
follows:
tPi =
∑
j 6=i
gj(x
∗
−i, x
∗
i )−
∑
j 6=i
gj(xˆ
i
−i, xˆ
i
i) , (4)
where, gi(x) is user i’s security cost function, x
∗ := (x∗−i, x
∗
i ) = argminx
∑
i gi(x)
is the socially optimal solution, and xˆi−i is the cost minimizing actions of users
j 6= i given user i’s action xˆii, and is determined by xˆ
i
−i = argminx−i
∑
j 6=i gj(x−i, xˆ
i
i).
In a game of complete information, xˆi will be the Nash equilibrium of the game
between user i and the N − 1 participating users.
It is straightforward to verify that this design of the Pivotal mechanism in
security games internalizes the externalities of users’ actions, and can thus lead
to the implementation of the socially optimal solution. Formally,
Proposition 1. In the Pivotal mechanism with taxes given by (4), investing
the socially optimal level of investment x∗i will be individually optimal, for all
users i. Therefore, the socially optimal solution is implemented.
Furthermore, such design will ensure participation by all users. That is,
Proposition 2. The Pivotal mechanism with taxes given by (4) satisfies all
voluntary participation constraints.
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The proofs of these propositions follow directly from existing literature, see
e.g. [10].
2.3. The Externality Mechanism
We next examine a taxation mechanism that can achieve the socially optimal
solution in security games, while maintaing a balanced budget. This mechanism
is adapted from [9]. The components of the mechanism are as follows.
The message space: Each user i provides a message mi := (χi,pii) to the
mechanism designer. χi ∈ R
N denotes user i’s proposal on the public good, i.e.,
it proposes the amount of security investment to be made by everyone in the
system, referred to as an investment profile.
pii ∈ R
N
+ denotes a pricing profile which suggests the amount to be paid
by everyone. As illustrated below, this is used by the designer to determine
the taxes of all users. Therefore, the pricing profile is user i’s proposal on the
private good.
The outcome function: The outcome function takes the message profiles
m := {m1,m2, . . . ,mN} as input, and determines the security investment profile
xˆ and a tax profile tˆE as follows:
xˆ(m) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
χi , (5)
tˆEi (m) = (pii+1 − pii+2)
T xˆ(m) + (χi − χi+1)
T diag(pii)(χi − χi+1)
− (χi+1 − χi+2)
Tdiag(pii+1)(χi+1 − χi+2), ∀i. (6)
In (6), N + 1 and N + 2 are treated as 1 and 2, respectively.
Note that as
∑
i tˆ
E
i = 0 by (6), the budget balance condition is satisfied
through this construction. What this means is that the designer will not be
spending resources or making profit, as the users whose tax tˆi is positive will
be financing the rewards for those who have negative taxes. In other words,
the mechanism proposes a tax redistribution scheme to incentivize improved
security investments.
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To establish that the Externality mechanism can implement the socially opti-
mal outcome in security games, we first need to show that a profile (xˆ(m∗), tˆE(m∗)),
derived at any possible NEm∗ of the Externality regulated game, is the socially
optimal solution. Formally,
Theorem 1. Let (xˆ(m∗), tˆE(m∗)) be the investment and tax profiles obtained at
the Nash equilibrium m∗ of the regulated security game. Then, xˆ is the optimal
solution to the centralized problem (2). Furthermore, if m¯ is any other Nash
equilibrium of the proposed game, then xˆ(m¯) = xˆ(m∗).
Furthermore, we have to show the converse of the previous statement, i.e.,
given an optimal investment profile, there exists an NE of Externality regulated
game which implements this solution. Formally, we can show the following:
Theorem 2. Let x∗ be the optimal investment profile in the solution to the
centralized problem (2). Then, there exists at least one Nash equilibrium m∗ of
the regulated security game such that xˆ(m∗) = x∗.
The proofs of these theorems follow the method used by [9, 11]. We refer
the interested reader to these papers, as well as our earlier work [13], where we
present a sketch of the proof of Theorem 1, along with an intuitive interpretation
for this mechanism. Using the proof of 1, we show that the tax terms tEi at the
equilibrium of the Externality mechanism are given by:
tEi (x
∗) = −
∑
j
x∗j
∂fi
∂xj
(x∗)−
∂hi
∂xi
x∗i . (7)
The interpretation is that by implementing this mechanism, each user i will be
financing part of user j 6= i’s reimbursement. According to (7), this amount is
proportional to the positive externality of j’s investment on user i’s utility.
3. An impossibility result
In the previous section, we stated two well-known tax-based incentive mech-
anisms for incentivizing socially optimal actions, namely the Pivotal and the
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Externality mechanisms, in the context of security games. The Pivotal mech-
anism is designed to guarantee voluntary participation, while the Externality
mechanism focuses on budget balance. Following these observations, one may
ask whether either of these schemes, or other tax-based mechanisms, can achieve
social optimality, while guaranteeing both budget balance and voluntary par-
ticipation simultaneously, in all instances of security games. In this section,
we show that in fact no such reliable mechanism exists. We illustrate this im-
possibility through two families of counter-examples. The first counter-example
considers games in which the network structure is a star topology, while the
second family focuses on security games with weakest link risk functions.
In what follows, to evaluate users’ voluntary participation conditions, we
consider a user i, referred to as the loner or outlier, who is unilaterally con-
templating opting out of this mechanism. As the game considered here is one
of full information, the remaining participating users, who are choosing a wel-
fare maximizing solution for their (N − 1)-user system, will have the ability to
predict the best-response of the loner to their collective action, and thus choose
their investments accordingly. As a result, the equilibrium investment profile
when user i opts out is the Nash equilibrium of the game between the N − 1
participating users and this loner. We will henceforth refer to this equilibrium
as the exit equilibrium (EE).
3.1. Counter-example I: the star topology
Assume some tax-based incentive mechanism M is proposed for security
games. Consider N users connected through the star topology depicted in Fig.
1, where the security decisions of the root affects all leaves, but each leaf’s
investment only affects itself and the root. Formally, let the cost function of the
root be given by:
g1(x) = f(x1 +
N∑
j=2
xj) + cx1 ,
and that of all leaves j ∈ {2, . . . , N} be:
gj(x) = f(x1 + xj) + cxj .
12 3 . . . N
Figure 1: No tax-based mechanism can guarantee SO, BB, and VP, in a star topology
Here, f(·) is any function satisfying the assumptions in Section 2. The invest-
ment cost functions hi(·) are linear, with the same unit investment cost c for all
users. To find the socially optimal investment profile, we solve the optimization
problem of minimizing the sum of all users’ costs, G(x) :=
∑N
i=1 gi(x), subject
to non-negative user investments. This profile, x∗, should satisfy:
∂f
∂x
(x∗1 +
N∑
j=2
x∗j ) +
N∑
j=2
∂f
∂x
(x∗1 + x
∗
j ) + c− λ1 = 0, λ1x
∗
1 = 0 ,
∂f
∂x
(x∗1 +
N∑
j=2
x∗j ) +
∂f
∂x
(x∗1 + x
∗
j ) + c− λj = 0, λjx
∗
j = 0, ∀j = 2, . . . , N .
Based on the above, it is easy to see that in the socially optimal investment
profile for this graph, only the root will be investing in security, while all leaves
free-ride on the resulting externality. This socially optimal investment profile
x∗ is given by:
∂f
∂x
(x∗1) = −
c
N
, x∗j = 0, ∀j = 2, . . . , N .
Now, assume the root user is considering stepping out of the mechanism. To
find the investment profile xˆ1 resulting from this unilateral deviation, first note
that the leaves’ security decisions will not affect one another, so that the socially
optimal investment profile for the N − 1 leaves is the same as their individually
optimal decisions. User 1 will also be choosing its individually optimal level of
investment. Therefore, using users’ first order conditions for cost minimization,
the exit equilibrium xˆ1 is:
∂f
∂x
(xˆ11) = −c, xˆ
1
j = 0, ∀j = 2, . . . , N .
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Finally, if any leaf user j ∈ {2, . . . , N} leaves the mechanism, the exit equi-
librium xˆj will satisfy:
∂f
∂x
(xˆj1 +
N∑
j=2
xˆji ) +
∑
k 6=1,j
∂f
∂x
(xˆj1 + x
j
k) + c− λ1 = 0, λ1xˆ
j
1 = 0 ,
∂f
∂x
(xˆj1 +
N∑
j=2
xˆji ) +
∂f
∂x
(xˆj1 + xˆ
j
k) + c− λk = 0, λkxˆ
j
k = 0, ∀k = 2, . . . , N, k 6= j
∂f
∂x
(xˆj1 + xˆ
j
j) + c− λj = 0, λj xˆ
j
j = 0, .
Again, it is easy to see that xˆjk = 0, ∀k ∈ {2, . . . , N}. Therefore, the exit
equilibrium when user j ∈ {2, . . . , N} unilaterally leaves the mechanism is given
by:
∂f
∂x
(xˆj1) = −
c
N − 1
, xˆjk = 0, ∀k = 2, . . . , N .
We now use the socially optimal investment profile and the exit equilibria
to evaluate voluntary participation and budget balance in a general mechanism
M. Assume M assigns a tax t∗i to a participating user i. Then, voluntary
participation will hold if and only if gi(x
∗, t∗i ) ≤ gi(xˆ
i), ∀i, which reduces to:
t∗1 ≤ f(xˆ
1
1)− f(x
∗
1) + c(xˆ
1
1 − x
∗
1) ,
t∗j ≤ f(xˆ
j
1)− f(x
∗
1), ∀j ∈ {2, . . . , N} .
The sum of these taxes is thus bounded by:
N∑
i=1
t∗i ≤ f(xˆ
1
1)− f(x
∗
1) + c(xˆ
1
1 − x
∗
1) + (N − 1)(f(xˆ
j
1)− f(x
∗
1))
However, the above sum could be negative, e.g., when f(z) = exp(−z) or f(z) =
1
z , indicating that weak budget balance will fail regardless of how the taxes are
determined in a mechanism M.
3.2. Counter-example II: weakest-link games
In this section, we again assume a general tax-based incentive mechanism
M is proposed for the security games. We focus on a family of security games
which approximate the weakest link risk function fi(x) = exp(−minj xj) [7, 1].
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Intuitively, this model states that an attacker can compromise the security
of an interconnected system by taking over the least protected node. To use
this model in our current framework, we need a continuous, differentiable ap-
proximation of the minimum function. We use the approximation minj xj ≈
− 1ρ log
∑
j exp(−ρxj), where the accuracy of the approximation is increasing in
the constant ρ > 0. User i’s cost function is thus given by:
gi(x) = (
N∑
j=1
exp(−ρxj))
1/ρ + cxi ,
where investment cost functions hi(·) are assumed to be linear, with the same
unit investment cost c for all users.
In this game, the socially optimal investment profile x∗ is given by the
solution to the first order condition
∂
∑
j
gj(x)
∂xi
= 0, which leads to:
N exp(−ρx∗i )(
N∑
j=1
exp(−ρx∗j ))
1
ρ
−1 = c , ∀i.
By symmetry, all users will be exerting the same socially optimal level of effort:
x∗i =
1
ρ
ln
N
cρ
, ∀i .
Next, assume a user i unilaterally steps out of the mechanism, while the
remaining users continue participating. The exit equilibrium profile xˆi can be
determined using:
(N − 1) exp(−ρxˆij)(
∑
k 6=i
exp(−ρxˆik) + exp(−ρxˆ
i
i))
1
ρ
−1 = c ,
exp(−ρxˆii)(
∑
k 6=i
exp(−ρxˆik) + exp(−ρxˆ
i
i))
1
ρ
−1 = c .
Solving the above, we get:
xˆii =
1
ρ
ln
21−ρ
cρ
xˆij =
1
ρ
ln
(N − 1)21−ρ
cρ
, ∀j 6= i .
We now use the socially optimal investment profile and the exit equilibria
to analyze users’ participation incentives in a general mechanismM, as well as
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the budget balance conditions. Denote by t∗i the tax assigned to user i by M.
A user i’s total cost functions when participating and staying out are given by:
gi(x
∗, t∗i ) = (N exp(−ρx
∗
i ))
1/ρ + cx∗i + t
∗
i = c(1 + x
∗
i ) + t
∗
i
gi(xˆ
i) = (exp(−ρxˆii) + (N − 1) exp(−ρxˆ
i
j))
1/ρ + cxˆii = c(2 + xˆ
i
i) .
The voluntary participation condition for this user will hold if and only if
gi(x
∗, t∗i ) ≤ gi(xˆ
i), which reduces to:
c(1 + x∗i ) + t
∗
i ≤ c(2 + xˆ
i
i)⇔ t
∗
i ≤ c(1 +
1
ρ
ln
21−ρ
N
) . (8)
On the other hand, for weak budget balance to hold, we need
∑
i t
∗
i ≥ 0. Nev-
ertheless, by (8), we have:
∑
i
t∗i ≤ cN(1 +
1
ρ
ln
21−ρ
N
) .
It is easy to see that given ρ and for any N > eρ21−ρ, the above sum will always
be negative, indicating a budget deficit for a general mechanism M, regardless
of how taxes are determined. 2
3.3. A note on the nature of this impossibility result
To close this section, we would like to point out that the impossibility result
on a simultaneous guarantee of social optimality, voluntary participation, and
weak budget balance, is demonstrated through two family of counter-examples.
In other words, we have shown that without prior knowledge of the graph struc-
ture or users’ preferences, it is not possible for a designer to propose a reliable
mechanism; that is, one which can promise to achieve SO, VP, and WBB, re-
gardless of the realizations of utilities. Nevertheless, it may still be possible
to design reliable mechanisms under a restricted space of problem parameters;
in fact we identify a few such instances in Section 4 by analyzing the class of
weighted total effort models.
2It is worth mentioning that when N ≤ eρ21−ρ, the Externality mechanism with taxes
determined by (7) will be budget balanced and guarantee voluntary participation. However,
the Pivotal mechanism will carry a deficit in both regions.
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4. Weighted total effort models: analysis and simulation
In the remainder of the paper, to further illustrate some of the parameters
affecting the performance of incentive mechanisms in security games, we focus
on the Pivotal and Externality mechanisms. We consider the special case of
weighted total effort games, and identify some of the factors that affect the total
budget and participation incentives in the Pivotal and Externality mechanisms,
respectively.
4.1. Choice of the risk function
The gap between the Nash equilibrium and the socially optimal investment
profile of a security game, as well as users’ participation incentives and possible
budget imbalances, are dependent on the specifics of the security cost functions
defined in (1). In particular, an appropriate choice of the risk functions fi(·) for
a given game is based on factors such as the type of interconnection, the extent
of interaction among users, and the type of attack. Several models of security
interdependency have been proposed and studied in the literature; these include
the total effort, weakest link, and best shot models considered in the seminal work
of Varian on security games [7], as well as the weakest target games proposed
in [12], the effective investment and bad traffic models in [5], and the linear
influence network games in [14].
In this paper, we take the special case of the weighted total effort games, with
exponential risks and linear investment cost functions, to study the effects of
interdependency on the performance of the Pivotal and Externality mechanisms.
Formally, the total cost function of a user i in this model is given by:
gi(x, ti) = exp(−
N∑
j=1
aijxj) + cxi + ti . (9)
Here, the investment cost function is assumed linear, hi(xi) = cxi. The coef-
ficients aij ≥ 0 determine the dependence of user i’s risk on user j’s action.
Consequently, user i’s risk is dependent on a weighted sum of all users’ actions.
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In particular, to isolate the effect of different features of the model on the per-
formance of the two mechanisms, we focus on three sub-classes of the weighted
total effort model. We first look at the effects of varying users’ self-dependence.
Next, we consider the effects of diversity, by breaking users into two groups of
self-dependent and reliant users. Finally, we study the effect of making all users
increasingly dependent on a single node’s action. We present numerical results
and intuitive interpretation for each of the above scenarios; formal analysis is
given in the online appendix.
4.2. Effects of self-dependence
Consider a collection of N users, with total cost functions determined ac-
cording to (9), with aii = a, ∀i, and aij = 1, ∀i, j 6= i:
gi(x, ti) = exp(−axi −
∑
j 6=i
xj) + cxi + ti .
We assume c < a, so as to ensure the existence of non-zero equilibria; i.e.,
at least one user exerts non-zero effort at any equilibrium of the game. The
socially optimal and exit equilibria of this game can be determined by using
the first order conditions on the users’ cost minimization problems, subject to
non-negative investments. The resulting systems of equations can be solved to
determine the possible exit equilibria, as well as parameter conditions under
which each equilibrium happens; the results are summarized in Table 1.
According to this table, we can identify five sets of parameter conditions un-
der which different exit equilibria are possible. We can further analyze each case
separately to find whether the voluntary participation conditions are satisfied
under the Externality mechanism, as well as whether the Pivotal mechanism
can operate without a budget deficit. These results are summarized in Table 1
as well.
4.2.1. Simulations: cases a > 1
As seen in Table 1, when a > 1, neither of the two mechanisms can maintain
a balanced budget and guarantee voluntary participation simultaneously, in
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Table 1: Can VP and BB hold simultaneously? - effect of self-dependence
Exit
Equilibrium
Parameter Conditions VP in
Externality
BB in
Pivotal
CASE α xˆii = 0, xˆ
i
j > 0 a > 1, and
(1+N−2a )
N−1 > (ac )
a−1
Never Never
CASE β xˆii > 0, xˆ
i
j > 0 a > 1, and
(1+N−2a )
N−1 < (ac )
a−1
Never Never
CASE γ xˆii = 0, xˆ
i
j > 0 a < 1, and ∀N, c Never Never
CASE ω xˆii > 0, xˆ
i
j = 0 a < 1, and
(1 + N−2a )
a < (ac )
1−a
Always Always
CASE ζ xˆii > 0, xˆ
i
j > 0 a < 1, and
(1 + N−2a )
a < (ac )
1−a
Always Always
either of the realized equilibria. In this section, we further examine the effect
of changing a, N , and c on the mechanisms’ performance. In particular, we
plot the sum of all taxes,
∑
i t
P
i , in the Pivotal mechanism. For the Externality
mechanism, we plot gi(xˆ
i)−gi(x
∗, tEi ) per user i; i.e., the benefit of participation
(in terms of cost reduction) for that user. We also consider the effect of these
changes on the price of anarchy of the security game, by looking at the ratio of
sum of the costs at the symmetric Nash equilibrium, over the sum of the costs
at the socially optimal solution.
Changing c. In order to understand the effect of the unit cost, we set N = 6
and a = 10. We then change the fraction a/c, so that initially we are in [Case
α]: xˆii = 0, xˆ
i
j > 0, and gradually move to [Case β]: xˆ
i
i > 0, xˆ
i
j > 0. Intuitively,
we will be gradually reducing the unit cost of investment, so that the outlier
finds it efficient to continue investing even when leaving the mechanism. Figure
2 illustrates the results.
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1.1
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Figure 2: Decreasing investment cost c
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−1
0 Sum of all taxes in the Pivotal mechanism
1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 5.5 61
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3 Price of anarchy
a
Figure 3: Increasing self-dependence a
Changing a. We next set N = 6 and c = 1. We then increase a, starting
from a = 1, so that initially we are in [Case α]: xˆii = 0, xˆ
i
j > 0, and gradually
move to [Case β]: xˆii > 0, xˆ
i
j > 0. Intuitively, we are gradually increasing self-
dependence, and therefore making a unit of investment more effective for the
user, so that outliers exert non-zero effort. Figure 3 illustrates the results.
Changing N . Finally, we set a = 6 and c = 1, and increase the number of
users N , starting from N = 3. As a result, we will initially be in [Case β]:
xˆii > 0, xˆ
i
j > 0, and gradually move to [Case α]: xˆ
i
i = 0, xˆ
i
j > 0. That is, once
enough users participate in the mechanism, the externality is high enough for
outliers to stop exerting effort. Figure 4 illustrates the results.
4.2.2. Intuitive explanation
We conclude that as predicted by the analysis, the Pivotal mechanism will
always carry a deficit, while the Externality mechanism will always fail to guar-
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20−0.1
−0.05
0
Benefit from participating in the Externality mechanism
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20−2
−1
0 Sum of all taxes in the Pivotal mechanism
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 201
1.2
1.4
Price of anarchy
N
Figure 4: Effect of increasing the number of agents N
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antee voluntary participation. We also observe that when the performance of
the mechanisms starts improving, the price of anarchy is decreasing, i.e., the
reduction in costs from introducing an incentive mechanism is decreasing. This
is because the performance of the mechanisms only improves when the system
is less interdependent: higher self-dependence, smaller unit costs, or small num-
ber of users, all lead to closer to optimal investments by individual users in
the state of anarchy. Such users would require smaller incentives to move to
the optimal state, hence the reduced budget deficit or smaller participation gap
in the Pivotal and Externality mechanisms, respectively. We conclude that in
these games, when incentive mechanism are more effective, there will be a need
for more substantive secondary incentives, or a higher initial budget injection,
in order to incentivize optimal investments.
4.3. Effects of diversity: two classes of self-dependence
Next, consider a collection of N users with the following total cost functions:
gi(x, ti) = exp(−aiixi −
∑
j 6=i
xj) + cxi + ti .
Assume that we have two classes of users: the self-dependent users N1 for whom
aii = a1, i ∈ N1, and the reliant users N2 = N −N1 for whom aii = a2, i ∈ N2.
We let c < a2 < 1 < a1. The assumption of a2 < 1 < a1 entails that users in
N2 are affected primarily by other users’ security decisions, while those in N1
are more self-dependent. The assumption of c < a2 < a1 ensures that in any
equilibrium of the game, at least one user will be exerting non-zero effort.
Similar to the previous section, the socially optimal investment profile and
the exit equilibria can be determined according to the first order conditions on
users’ cost minimization problems subject to non-negative investments. Denote
the investments of users in N1 and N2 by x1 and x2, respectively, It is easy to
show that given the same unit investment costs c, and the fact that a2 < 1 <
a1, we get x2 = 0 in the socially optimal investment profile. In other words,
the users in N2 will never invest in security as they will instead rely on the
externality from users in N1. Also, with c < a1, we get x1 > 0. Therefore,
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self-dependent users in N1 will be main investors, while reliant users in N2 are
free-riders. We again omit full analysis for the derivation of the socially optimal
solution and the exit equilibria (see online appendix), and limit our discussion
to some interesting features of the possible exit equilibria.
First, it is easy to show that any reliant user N2 staying in the mechanism
following the unilateral deviation of one other user will continue as a free-rider.
However, when such user unilaterally exits a mechanism, although there always
exists an exit equilibrium in which this user continues as a free-rider, there may
also exist equilibria under which this user exerts non-zero effort while all other
users free-ride. In particular, for i ∈ N2, an exit equilibrium xˆ
i
i > 0, xˆ
i
j = 0, ∀j 6=
i exists if and only if:
a1 +N − 2
c
≤ (
a2
c
)
1
a2 .
Intuitively, with a2 small enough, given that no other user is investing in security,
user i ∈ N2 will need to exert relatively high effort to reduce its own risk. The
considerable externality from this high effort ensures that not investing is a best
response for the remaining users.
Similarly, a user from N1 who leaves the mechanism may continue investing,
or become a free-rider. In particular, for i ∈ N1, an exit equilibrium xˆ
i
i = 0, xˆ
i
j >
0, ∀j ∈ N1\{i}, xˆ
i
k = 0, ∀k ∈ N2, where i ∈ N1 becomes a free-rider, exists if
and only if:
(a1 +N1 − 2)(
c
a1
)
a1−1
N1−1 +N2 ≥ a1
4.3.1. Simulations
Assume first that a2 is relatively small, such that when users from i ∈ N2
step out, xˆii > 0, xˆ
i
j = 0, ∀j 6= i is a possible exit equilibrium. We gradually
increase a1, so that initially xˆ
i
i = 0, xˆ
i
j > 0, ∀j ∈ N1\{i}, xˆ
i
k = 0, ∀k ∈ N2 is
a possible EE for users from N1, but past a threshold, xˆ
i
i > 0, xˆ
i
j > 0, ∀j ∈
N1\{i}, xˆ
i
k = 0, ∀k ∈ N2 is the realized equilibrium. We look at the N1 and N2
users’ benefit (in terms of cost reduction) from participating in the Externality
mechanism, the budget of the Pivotal mechanism, and the price of anarchy of
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Figure 5: Increasing a1 for smaller a2
the game, defined as the sum of costs at the symmetric NE over the total costs
at the SO.
In particular, we set N = 10, and N1 = 8, c = 0.05, a2 = 0.1, and change
a1 ∈ [1, 10]. The results are depicted in Fig. 5. First, we observe that the
Pivotal mechanism will carry a surplus; i.e., WBB holds. Also, VP constraints
for users in N2 will be satisfied in the Externality mechanism. However, users
from N1 will only have VP when the exit equilibrium is one with xˆ
i
i > 0, xˆ
i
j >
0, ∀j ∈ N1\{i}, xˆ
i
k = 0, ∀k ∈ N2. We conclude that these users are only willing
to participate in the mechanism if they have to exert non-zero effort even when
they stay out.
We next repeat the same simulations, but this time focus on a case with
a2 = 0.9. With this choice of a2, the EE for a user i ∈ N2 is so that xˆ
i
i =
0, xˆij > 0, ∀j ∈ N1, xˆ
i
k = 0, ∀k ∈ N2\{i}. In other words, these users’ will
be free-riders whether they participate or not. Consequently, we observe that
the participation incentives of users in N2 will no longer be satisfied in the
Externality mechanism. In addition, the Pivotal mechanism will carry a budget
deficit. These observations are illustrated in Fig. 6.
4.3.2. Intuitive explanation
The previous figures illustrate how users’ voluntary participation constraints
in the Externality mechanism are highly affected by their actions in the exit
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Figure 6: Increasing a1 for larger a2
equilibria. In particular, in the first scenario, we observe that the VP conditions
of users in N1 are satisfied only when they are required to exert non-zero effort
even when exiting. Similarly, by comparing Figs 5 and 6, we see that users in
N2 will voluntarily participate if they are forced to act as investors when staying
out. Finally, when the exit equilibrium requires users in N2 to invest in security,
the Pivotal mechanism is able to extract higher taxes from users in N2, as such
equilibrium increases other users’ costs considerably compared to the socially
optimal solution. This in turn leads to the budget surplus illustrated in Fig. 5.
4.4. Effects of a single dominant user
Consider a collection of N users with weighted total effort risk functions (9).
Let a1j = a > 1, ∀j, and aij = 1, ∀i 6= 1, ∀j. That is, as a grows, all users’ risks
become increasingly affected by user 1’s effort. Thus, users’ total cost functions
are given by:
gi(x, ti) = exp(−ax1 −
N∑
j=2
xj) + cxi + ti
We again assume that c < 1 < a, so as to ensure that at least one user exerts
non-zero effort at any equilibrium of the game.
It is easy to show that in a socially optimal investment profile x∗, only
user 1 will be exerting effort. This will also be the case when users other than
the dominant user leave the mechanism. When the dominant user opts out
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Table 2: Can VP and BB hold simultaneously? - single dominant user
Exit
Equilibrium
Parameter
Conditions
VP in
Externality
BB in
Pivotal
CASE α xˆ11 = 0, xˆ
1
j > 0, ∀j 6= 1
xˆi1 > 0, xˆ
i
j = 0, ∀i, j 6= 1
a < N − 1 Never Never
CASE β xˆ11 > 0, xˆ
1
j = 0, ∀j 6= 1
xˆi1 > 0, xˆ
i
j = 0, ∀i, j 6= 1
a > N − 1 Never Never
of the mechanism, however, the exit equilibria will depend on the externality
available to this user from the participating nodes. The possible equilibria and
parameter conditions for which each is possible, as well as the performance of
both mechanisms, are summarized in Table 2.
4.4.1. Simulations
To verify the analysis summarized in Table 2, we plot a user’s benefit from
participating in the Externality mechanism (i.e., gi(xˆ
i)− gi(x, t
E
i )), the budget
of the Pivotal mechanism (i.e.,
∑
i t
P
i ), and the price of anarchy of the game, as
the dependence on the dominant user, a, increases.
In particular, we set N = 10, c = 0.45, and increase a from 1 to 15. As a
result, we will initially be in Case α, with xˆ11 = 0 and move to Case β, with
xˆ11 > 0 once a > N − 1. The results are depicted in Fig. 7. As predicted by our
analysis, the Pivotal mechanism will always carry a deficit. Also, the voluntary
participation condition for non-dominant users will fail under both mechanisms.
4.4.2. Intuitive explanation
We observe that in these family of games, having a less beneficial equilibrium
leads to the voluntary participation of the dominant user, as seen in the top plot
in Fig. 7. As the exit equilibria for the non-dominant users remains unchanged,
so does their participation incentives. Furthermore, we see that no equilibrium
can lead to budget surplus in the Pivotal mechanism. That is, although the
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Figure 7: Effect of increasing a - single dominant user
Pivotal mechanism needs to give out a smaller reward to the dominant user
in Case β as compared to Case α (hence the jump in the third plot in Fig.
7), it still fails to avoid a deficit in both cases, due to the small willingness of
free-riders to pay the taxes required to cover this reward.
4.5. Insights from the weighted total effort model
First, note that we have identified families of positive instances ; i.e, problem
parameters under which one or both mechanisms can achieve participation and
maintain a balanced budget simultaneously. These include Cases ω and ζ in
Table 1, which are positive instances for both mechanisms, as well as the region
with small a1 and a2 parameters, Fig. 5, which is a positive instance for the
Pivotal mechanism. It is also worth mentioning the insight behind the existence
of each positive instance:
- In Cases ω and ζ of Table 1, incentive mechanisms allow an exchange of
favors among users: as all users are mainly dependent on others’ invest-
ments, they coordinate to each increase their investments in return for
improved investments by other users.
- In the region with small a1 and a2 parameters in Fig. 5, the Pivotal mech-
anism is successful as it facilitates the transfer of funds from the reliant
users to the self-dependent users in return for their improved investments.
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Second, we observe that when possible, the selection of exit equilibria that
are less beneficial to the outliers helps the performance of both mechanisms.
A less beneficial equilibrium can be one that requires a free-rider to become
an investor when leaving the mechanism, or one that requires an investor to
continue exerting effort when out (although possibly at a lower level). One
instance of this feature can be seen by comparing Cases ω and ζ with Case
γ in Table 1. The same can be observed from Fig. 5, when a1 grows, and
also by comparing Figs. 5 and 6. Based on this observation, we can expect
that in a repeated game setup of security games, by punishing outliers with
an appropriate selection of less beneficial equilibria, social optimality, voluntary
participation, and budget balance conditions can be simultaneously guaranteed.
5. Related Work
The problem of incentivizing optimal security investments in an intercon-
nected system is one example of problems concerning the provision of non-
excludable public goods in social and economic networks. Other examples in-
clude creation of new parks or libraries at neighborhood level in cities [15],
reducing pollution by neighboring towns [16], or spread of innovation and re-
search in industry [17]. We summarize some of the work most relevant to the
current paper.
[17] introduces a network model of public goods, and studies different fea-
tures of its Nash equilibria. This model is equivalent to a total effort game with
linear investment costs and a general interdependence graph. The authors show
that these games always have a specialized Nash equilibrium; i.e., one in which
users are either specialists exerting full effort (equivalent to main investors in
our terminology), or free-riders. They show that such equilibria correspond
to maximal independent sets of the graph, and that specialized equilibira may
lead to higher welfare compared to other (distributed) Nash equilibria. Simi-
larly, [18] studies the Nash equilibrium of a linear quadratic interdependence
model, and relates the equilibrium effort levels to the nodes’ Bonacich central-
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ity in a suitably defined matrix of local complementarities. The work in [15]
generalizes these results by studying existence, uniqueness, and closed form of
the Nash equilibrium in a broader class of games for which best-responses are
linear in other players’ actions. All the aforementioned work focuses on the
Nash equilibrium in public good provision environments.
The work of [16] is the most relevant to our work, as it focuses on implemen-
tation of Pareto efficient public good outcomes, rather than the Nash equilibria
on a given network. The authors define a benefits matrix for any given network
graph; an entry Bij of the matrix is the marginal rate at which i’s effort can be
substituted by the externality of j’s action. The main result of the paper states
that efforts at a Lindahl outcome constitute an eigenvalue centrality vector of
this benefits matrix. One such Pareto efficient outcome, the socially optimal
outcome, can be implemented using Lindahl taxes determined through the Ex-
ternality mechanism. The current paper differs from [16] in both modeling and
results. First, while a user’s action in [16] is strictly costly for the user itself,
users in our framework benefit from their own investments as well. More im-
portantly, the focus of [16] is on characterizing users’ effort levels in terms of
network structure for Lindahl outcomes, the individual rationality of which is
established by comparing the Pareto efficient outcome with the state of anarchy,
rather than considering unilateral deviations from the mechanism. Our work on
the other hand considers both Lindahl and Pivotal taxes, and focuses on users’
voluntary participation incentives when unilaterally opting out, as well as tax
balance issues.
Finally, in the context of security games, our work in Section 4 is most
related to [5, 14]. The weighted total effort risk model is a generalization of
the total effort model in [7], and is similar to the effective investment model in
[5] and the linear influence network game in [14]. The linear influence models
in [14] have been proposed to study properties of the interdependence matrix
affecting the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium. The effective
investment model in [5] has been considered to determine a bound on the price
of anarchy gap, i.e. the gap between the socially optimal and Nash equilibrium
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investments, in security games. Our work on the above model complements this
literature, by considering the effect of users’ interdependence on the performance
of incentive mechanisms.
6. Conclusion
We have shown that in the problem of provision of non-excludable pub-
lic goods on networks, under general assumptions on the graph structure and
users’ preferences, it is not possible to design a tax-based incentive mechanism
to implement the socially optimal solution while guaranteeing voluntary par-
ticipation and maintaining a (weakly) balanced budget. Even under a fully
connected graph and users with weighted total effort risk functions, we need
further conditions on problem parameters (e.g. number of users, the level of
interdependence, and cost of investment) to ensure that the well-known Pivotal
and Externality mechanisms can achieve social optimality, budget balance, and
voluntary participation, simultaneously. These positive instances occur when
users can exchange favors by agreeing on increasing their investments, or when
they can transfer funds to the more influential users in return for their increased
efforts. A comprehensive characterization of problem instances in which all re-
quirements can be simultaneously satisfied remains a main direction of future
work.
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Appendix
1. Exit equilibria of the weighted total effort model - varying self-
dependence
In this appendix, we solve for the socially optimal investment profile, and
identify the possible exit equilibria, and parameter conditions under which each
equilibrium is possible.
The socially optimal investment profile in this game will be given by:
x∗i =
1
a+N − 1
ln
a+N − 1
c
, ∀i .
To find the exit equilibrium when a user i steps out, xˆi, we can write the first
order conditions on the users’ cost minimization problems. To simplify notation,
we denote x := xˆii and y := xˆ
i
j , ∀j 6= i. The system of equation determining x
and y is given by:
−a exp(−ax− (N − 1)y) + c ≥ 0
−(a+N − 2) exp(−x− (a+N − 2)y) + c ≥ 0 . (10)
There are four possible exit equilibria, depending on the whether x and/or y
are non-zero. We look at each case separately.
1.1. Exit equilibria with x > 0, y > 0
Intuitively, when user i steps out, both sides continue to invest in security,
perhaps at reduced levels, but no user is fully free-riding. We would need the
following to hold simultaneously:
−a exp(−ax− (N − 1)y) + c = 0
−(a+N − 2) exp(−x− (a+N − 2)y) + c = 0 .
Let L1 = log
a
c and L2 = log
a+N−2
c . Solving for x, y leads to:
x =
1
(a− 1)(a+N − 1)
log(
a
c
)a−1(1 +
N − 2
a
)−(N−1)
y =
1
(a− 1)(a+N − 1)
log(
a
c
)a−1(1 +
N − 2
a
)a .
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To find the range of parameters for which the above holds, we need to ensure
that x, y are indeed positive.
• If a > 1, then y > 0. For x > 0, we need:
(
a
c
)a−1 > (1 +
N − 2
a
)N−1
• If a < 1, then x > 0. For y > 0, we need:
(1 +
N − 2
a
)a < (
a
c
)1−a
1.2. Exit equilibria with x > 0, y = 0
In this case, the participating users revert to investing zero, so that the
outlier is forced to increase its investment:
−a exp(−ax) + c = 0
−(a+N − 2) exp(−x) + c > 0 .
As a result, we get x = 1a log
a
c . For this to be consistent with the second
condition, we require:
(1 +
N − 2
a
)a < (
a
c
)1−a
The above always fails to hold for a > 1, as the LHS is always more than 1,
while the RHS is surely less than 1 by the assumption a > c. Intuitively, when
self-dependence is higher than co-dependence on the outlier, the remaining users
will not rely solely on externalities and continue investing when user i steps out.
For a < 1 on the other hand, for a small enough c (which in turn leads to
higher investment x be the outlier), the equation may hold.
1.3. Exit equilibria with x = 0, y > 0
This means that the loner free-rides, so that we have:
−a exp(−(N − 1)y) + c > 0
−(a+N − 2) exp(−(a+N − 2)y) + c = 0 .
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As a result, we get y = 1a+N−2 log
a+N−2
c . For this to be consistent with the
first condition, we need:
(1 +
N − 2
a
)N−1 > (
a
c
)a−1
Note that this always hold for a < 1, but not necessarily for a > 1.
1.4. Exit equilibria with x = 0, y = 0
We would need the following to hold simultaneously:
−a+ c > 0
−(a+N − 2) + c > 0 ,
which will never hold, as we initially required that c < a.
2. BB and VP in exit equilibria - varying self-dependence
In this appendix, we separately analyze each of the possible cases identified
in Appendix 1, summarized in Table 1. Specifically, we are interested in the
Budget balance condition under the Pivotal mechanism, and users’ participation
incentives in the Externality mechanism.
2.1. Case α: fails BB, fails VP
In this case, the underlying parameters satisfy a > 1 and (1 + N−2a )
N−1 >
(ac )
a−1. As a result, the exit equilibrium (EE) is such that x = 0, and y =
1
a+N−2 log
a+N−2
c . Therefore, the costs of users at the SO and EE are given by:
gj(x
∗) =
c
a+N − 1
(1 + log
a+N − 1
c
), ∀j
gj(xˆ
i) =
c
a+N − 2
(1 + log
a+N − 2
c
), ∀j 6= i
gi(xˆ
i) =
c
a+N − 2
N−1
a+N−2
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Budget Balance in the Pivotal mechanism:. Note that 1+log zz is a decreasing
function of z. Thus, gj(xˆ
i) > gj(x
∗) for all j, resulting in tPi < 0, indicating
rewards to all users i, and thus a budget deficit in all scenarios. Intuitively,
although when a user i steps out, other users have to invest less in security, thus
decreasing their direct investment costs, still their overall security costs go up
as a result of the increased risks. Consequently, each user i should be payed a
reward to be kept in the mechanism, resulting in a budget deficit.
Voluntary Participation in the Externality mechanism:. Voluntary participation
will hold if and only if gi(xˆ
i) ≥ gi(x
∗), that is:
c
a+N − 2
N−1
a+N−2
≥
c
a+N − 1
(1 + log
a+N − 1
c
)
⇔
c
a+N − 2
N−1
≥ (
c
a+N − 1
)a−1+N−1(1 + log
a+N − 1
c
)a−1+N−1
⇔(
a+N − 1
a+N − 2
)N−1(1 +
N − 1
a
)a−1(
a
c
)
a−1
− (1 + log
a
c
(1 +
N − 1
a
))a+N−2 ≥ 0
Based on the last inequality, define the function g(z) := κ1z
a−1 − (1 +
log z)a+N−2. This function is increasing in z. As a result, it obtains its maxi-
mum when z reaches its maximum value, which by the initial condition is given
by ac = (1 +
N−2
a )
N−1
a−1 . Thus,
gmax = (
a+N − 1
a+N − 2
)N−1(1 +
N − 1
a
)a−1(1 +
N − 2
a
)N−1
− (1 + log(1 +
N − 2
a
)
N−1
a−1 (1 +
N − 1
a
))a+N−2
≤ (1 +
N − 1
a
)a+N−2 − (1 + log(1 +
N − 1
a
) +
N − 1
a− 1
log (1 +
N − 2
a
))a+N−2
≤ (1 +
N − 1
a
)a+N−2 − (1 + log(1 +
N − 1
a
) +
N − 1
a
log (1 +
N − 2
a
))a+N−2
Let z := N−1a , and define f(z) := log(1 + z) + z log(1 + z −
1
a )− z (i.e., we are
assuming a fixed a). The derivative of this function wrt z is given by:
1
1 + z
+ log(1 + z −
1
a
) +
z
1 + z − 1a
− 1 = log(1 + z −
1
a
) +
1
az
(1 + z)(1− 1a + z)
.
As the above is positive for all a > 1, we conclude that f(z) is an increasing
function in z. Furthermore, limz→0 f(z) = 0, which in turn means that f(z) ≥
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0, ∀z ≥ 0, and therefore, gmax is always non-positive. This in turn means that
the VP condition can never be satisfied.
2.2. Case β: fails BB, fails VP
For this case, the underlying parameters satisfy a > 1 and (1 + N−2a )
N−1 <
(ac )
a−1. As a result, the exit equilibrium (EE) is such that x > 0, y > 0, and are
given by x = 1(a−1)(a+N−1) log (
a
c )
a−1(1 + N−2a )
−(N−1) and
y = 1(a−1)(a+N−1) log (
a
c )
a−1(1 + N−2a )
a. Therefore, the costs of users at the
SO and EE are given by:
gj(x
∗) =
c
a+N − 1
(1 + log
a+N − 1
c
), ∀j
gj(xˆ
i) =
c
a+N − 2
+
c
(a− 1)(a+N − 1)
log (
a
c
)a−1(1 +
N − 2
a
)a, ∀j 6= i
gi(xˆ
i) =
c
a
+
c
(a− 1)(a+N − 1)
log (
a
c
)a−1(1 +
N − 2
a
)−(N−1)
Budget Balance in the Pivotal mechanism:. For the mechanism to have a budget
deficit we would need gj(xˆ
i) ≥ gj(x
∗), which holds if and only if:
c
a+N − 1
(1 + log
a+N − 1
c
) ≤
c
a+N − 2
+
c
(a− 1)(a+N − 1)
log (
a
c
)a−1(1 +
N − 2
a
)a
⇔1 + log
a
c
(1 +
N − 1
a
) ≤ 1 +
1
a+N − 2
+ log
a
c
(1 +
N − 2
a
)
a
a−1
⇔ log(1 +
N − 1
a
) ≤
1
a+N − 2
+
a
a− 1
log (1 +
N − 2
a
)
⇐ log(1 +
N − 1
a
) ≤
1
a+N − 2
+ log (1 +
N − 2
a
)
⇔ log(1 +
1
a+N − 2
) ≤
1
a+N − 2
The last line is true because log(1 + x) ≤ x, for all x > 0. Therefore, the
mechanism always carries a budget deficit.
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Voluntary Participation in the Externality mechanism:. The mechanism fails
voluntary participation if and only if:
c
a+N − 1
(1 + log
a+N − 1
c
) ≥
c
a
+
c
(a− 1)(a+N − 1)
log (
a
c
)a−1(1 +
N − 2
a
)−(N−1)
⇔1 + log
a
c
(1 +
N − 1
a
) ≥ 1 +
N − 1
a
+ log
a
c
(1 +
N − 2
a
)
−(N−1)
a−1
⇔ log(1 +
N − 1
a
) +
N − 1
a− 1
log (1 +
N − 2
a
) ≥
N − 1
a
⇐ log(1 +
N − 1
a
) +
N − 1
a
log (1 +
N − 1
a
−
1
a
) ≥
N − 1
a
Let z := N−1a , and define f(z) := log(1 + z) + z log(1 + z −
1
a )− z (i.e., we are
assuming a fixed a). The derivative of this function wrt z is given by:
1
1 + z
+ log(1 + z −
1
a
) +
z
1 + z − 1a
− 1 = log(1 + z −
1
a
) +
1
az
(1 + z)(1− 1a + z)
.
As the above is positive for all a > 1, we conclude that f(z) is an increasing
function in z. Furthermore, limz→0 f(z) = 0, which in turn means that f(z) ≥
0, ∀z ≥ 0, and therefore, that the VP condition always fails to hold under these
parameter settings.
2.3. Case γ: fails BB, fails VP
Here, we only require that a < 1, and all other values ofN or c will guarantee
the existence of an equilibrium x = 0 and y = 1a+N−2 log
a+N−2
c . This is thus
parallel with Case α. Users’ costs in the SO and EE are similarly given by:
gj(x
∗) =
c
a+N − 1
(1 + log
a+N − 1
c
), ∀j
gj(xˆ
i) =
c
a+N − 2
(1 + log
a+N − 2
c
), ∀j 6= i
gi(xˆ
i) =
c
a+N − 2
N−1
a+N−2
Budget Balance in the Pivotal mechanism:. Note that 1+log zz is a decreasing
function of z. Thus, gj(xˆ
i) > gj(x
∗) for all j, resulting in tPi < 0, indicating
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rewards to all users i, and thus a budget deficit in all scenarios (exactly similar
to case α).
Voluntary Participation in the Externality mechanism:. Voluntary participation
will fail if and only if gi(xˆ
i) ≤ gi(x
∗), that is:
c
a+N − 2
N−1
a+N−2
≤
c
a+N − 1
(1 + log
a+N − 1
c
)
⇔
c
a+N − 2
N−1
≤ (
c
a+N − 1
)a−1+N−1(1 + log
a+N − 1
c
)a−1+N−1
⇔(
a
c (1 +
N−1
a )
1 + log ac (1 +
N−1
a )
)a−1 ≥ (
1 + log ac (1 +
N−1
a )
1 + 1a+N−2
)N−1
First, we note that the RHS is always greater than 1, as 1 + log x ≤ x. On the
other hand, since a < 1, 1a+N−2 < log
a
c (1 +
N−1
a ) holds for all N ≥ 3, so that
the LHS will be less than 1. Therefore, the VP condition always fails.
2.4. Case ζ: has BB, has VP
This case has equilibrium investments similar to case β, but under parameter
conditions a < 1, and (1 + N−2a )
a < (ac )
1−a. Therefore, we have the following
costs for the users:
gj(x
∗) =
c
a+N − 1
(1 + log
a+N − 1
c
), ∀j
gj(xˆ
i) =
c
a+N − 2
+
c
(a− 1)(a+N − 1)
log (
a
c
)a−1(1 +
N − 2
a
)a, ∀j 6= i
gi(xˆ
i) =
c
a
+
c
(a− 1)(a+N − 1)
log (
a
c
)a−1(1 +
N − 2
a
)−(N−1)
Budget Balance in the Pivotal mechanism:. For the mechanism to have budget
balance we would need gj(xˆ
i) ≤ gj(x
∗), which holds if and only if:
c
a+N − 1
(1 + log
a+N − 1
c
) ≥
c
a+N − 2
+
c
(a− 1)(a+N − 1)
log (
a
c
)a−1(1 +
N − 2
a
)a
⇔1 + log
a
c
(1 +
N − 1
a
) ≥ 1 +
1
a+N − 2
+ log
a
c
(1 +
N − 2
a
)
a
a−1
⇔ log(1 +
N − 1
a
) ≥
1
a+N − 2
+
a
a− 1
log (1 +
N − 2
a
)
⇐ log(1 +
N − 1
a
) ≥
1
a+N − 2
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The last line follows from the previous because a < 1, and is true because its
LHS is ≥ logN and its RHS is ≤ 1/(N − 1). Therefore, the mechanism always
has budget balance in this scenario.
Voluntary Participation in the Externality mechanism:. The mechanism has
voluntary participation if and only if:
c
a+N − 1
(1 + log
a+N − 1
c
) ≤
c
a
+
c
(a− 1)(a+N − 1)
log (
a
c
)a−1(1 +
N − 2
a
)−(N−1)
⇔1 + log
a
c
(1 +
N − 1
a
) ≤ 1 +
N − 1
a
+ log
a
c
(1 +
N − 2
a
)
−(N−1)
a−1
⇔ log(1 +
N − 1
a
)(1 +
N − 2
a
)
N−1
a−1 ≤
N − 1
a
The last statement holds because the second element in the logarithm is always
less than 1, due to a < 1, and the result follows as log(1 + z) ≤ z, for all z > 0.
2.5. Case ω: has BB, has VP
The last case in realized under parameter settings a < 1 and (1 + N−2a )
a <
(ac )
1−a, and x = log ac and y = 0 is the possible exit equilibrium. The users’
costs in the SO and EE here are given by:
gj(x
∗) =
c
a+N − 1
(1 + log
a+N − 1
c
), ∀j
gj(xˆ
i) = (
c
a
)
1
a , ∀j 6= i
gi(xˆ
i) =
c
a
(1 + log
a
c
) .
Budget Balance in the Pivotal mechanism:. First we use (1+N−2a )
a < (ac )
1−a to
conclude that ( ca )
1
a ≤ ca+N−2 . Now, for the mechanism to have budget balance
we would need gj(xˆ
i) ≤ gj(x
∗), which holds if and only if:
c
a+N − 1
(1 + log
a+N − 1
c
) ≥ (
c
a
)
1
a
⇐1 + log
a
c
(1 +
N − 1
a
) ≥ 1 +
1
a+N − 2
⇐ log(1 +
N − 1
a
) ≥
1
a+N − 2
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where the last line line follows from the previous because ac > 1, and is true be-
cause its LHS is ≥ logN and its RHS is ≤ 1/(N−1). Therefore, the mechanism
always has budget balance in this scenario.
Voluntary Participation in the Externality mechanism:. As 1+log xx is a decreas-
ing function in x when x > 1, and 1 < ac <
a+N−1
c , the costs when staying out
are higher for user i. Therefore VP is satisfied in the Externality mechanism in
this case.
3. Exit equilibria of the weighted total effort model - two classes of
self-dependence
In this appendix, we present a (partial) analysis of possible exit equilibria,
and parameter conditions under which each is possible, for the wighted total
effort family described in Section 4.3. Denoting the investments of the users in
N1 and N2 by x1 and x2, respectively, the socially optimal investment profile
in this game is determined according to the first order conditions on users’ cost
minimization problems:
− (a1 +N1 − 1) exp(−(a1 +N1 − 1)x1 −N2x2)−N2 exp(−N1x1 − (a2 +N2 − 1)x2) + c ≥ 0 ,
−N1 exp(−(a1 +N1 − 1)x1 −N2x2)− (a2 +N2 − 1) exp(−N1x1 − (a2 +N2 − 1)x2) + c ≥ 0 .
It is easy to see that at this socially optimal solution, x2 = 0, and x1 is given
by:
(a1 +N1 − 1) exp(−(a1 +N1 − 1)x1) +N2 exp(−N1x1) = c .
In general, the above equation does not have a closed form solution. However,
it is possible to find a lower bound and an upper bound on the solution x∗1. It is
also possible to solve for x∗1 numerically. Once we solve for this socially optimal
investment, we can determine the taxes assigned by the Externality mechanism:
tEi = (a1 +N1 − 1)x1 exp(−(a1 +N1 − 1)x1)− cx1, ∀i ∈ N1 ,
tEi = N1x1 exp(−N1x1), ∀i ∈ N2 .
39
Note that the sum of the above taxes is indeed zero. Also, it is interesting to
note that as expected, the free-riders in N2 always pay a tax, while the main
investors in N1 receive a subsidy. In order to find exit equilibria in this family of
games, we would again need to solve equations with a similar format to that of
the socially optimal solution, which in general lack a closed form solution. We
therefore do not include a full analysis of this scenario, and limit our discussion
to some interesting features of the possible exit equilibria.
3.1. Exit equilibrium: a user from N1 leaving
Let x denote the investment of the deviating user from group N1, and y1
and y2 denote the investments of users remaining in N1 and N2. We have the
following system of equations:
− a1 exp(−a1x− (N1 − 1)y1 −N2y2) + c ≥ 0 ,
− (a1 +N1 − 2) exp(−x− (a1 +N1 − 2)y1 −N2y2)
−N2 exp(−x− (N1 − 1)y1 − (a2 +N2 − 1)y2) + c ≥ 0 ,
− (N1 − 1) exp(−x− (a1 +N1 − 2)y1 −N2y2)
− (a2 +N2 − 1) exp(−x− (N1 − 1)y1 − (a2 +N2 − 1)y2) + c ≥ 0 .
By an argument similar to that in the derivation of the SO solution in 4.3, we
will always have y2 = 0. As a result, the system of equations reduces to:
− a1 exp(−a1x− (N1 − 1)y1)+ c ≥ 0 ,
− (a1 +N1 − 2) exp(−x− (a1 +N1 − 2)y1)−N2 exp(−x− (N1 − 1)y1)+ c ≥ 0 .
We consider the following possible cases, depending on whether x and/or y1 are
non-zero.
3.1.1. Exit equilibria with x > 0, y1 > 0
This would require a solution to the following system of equations:
a1 exp(−a1x− (N1 − 1)y1) = c ,
(a1 +N1 − 2) exp(−x− (a1 +N1 − 2)y1) +N2 exp(−x− (N1 − 1)y1) = c .
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The above equations tell us that:
a1x+ (N1 − 1)y1 = log
a1
c
.
We can now substitute y1 in the second equation to find x:
(a1 +N1 − 2) exp(−[log
a1
c
− (a1 − 1)x]
−
a1 − 1
N1 − 1
[log
a1
c
− a1x]) +N2 exp(−[log
a1
c
− (a1 − 1)x]) = c ,
which can be solved numerically.
3.1.2. Exit equilibria with x = 0, y1 > 0
This would require:
a1 exp(−(N1 − 1)y1) ≤ c ,
(a1 +N1 − 2) exp(−(a1 +N1 − 2)y1) +N2 exp(−(N1 − 1)y1) = c .
The first equation above can be used to find a lower-bound on y1. Intuitively, the
investments y1 should be high enough for the outlier to decide against investing
(i.e., set x = 0). We have:
y1 ≥
1
N1 − 1
log
a1
c
.
Given that the LHS of the second equation, which determins y1, is decreasing
in y1, the above system of equation is consistent if and only if:
(a1 +N1 − 2)(
c
a1
)
a1−1
N1−1 +N2 ≥ a1 .
3.1.3. Exit equilibria with x > 0, y1 = 0
This requires that x = 1a1 log
a1
c , and that:
− (a1 +N1 − 2) exp(−x)−N2 exp(−x) + c ≥ 0
⇔(a1 +N − 2)(
c
a1
)
1
a1 ≤ c⇔ (1 +
N − 2
a1
)a1 ≤ (
c
a1
)a1−1 .
It is easy to see that the LHS is always greater than 1, while the RHS is less
than 1, making this exit equilibrium impossible.
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3.1.4. Exit equilibria with x = 0, y1 = 0
This case will never happen, as c < a1.
3.2. Exit equilibrium: a user from N2 leaving
Let x denote the investment of the deviating user from group N2, and y1
and y2 denote the investments of users remaining in N1 and N2. We have the
following system of equations:
− a2 exp(−a2x−N1y1 − (N2 − 1)y2) +c ≥ 0 ,
− (a1 +N1 − 1) exp(−x− (a1 +N1 − 1)y1 − (N2 − 1)y2)
− (N2 − 1) exp(−x−N1y1 − (a2 +N2 − 2)y2) +c ≥ 0 ,
−N1 exp(−x− (a1 +N1 − 1)y1 − (N2 − 1)y2)
− (a2 +N2 − 2) exp(−x−N1y1 − (a2 +N2 − 2)y2) +c ≥ 0 .
By an argument similar to that in the derivation of the SO solution in 4.3, we
will always have y2 = 0. As a result, the system of equations reduces to:
− a2 exp(−a2x−N1y1) + c ≥ 0 ,
− (a1 +N1 − 1) exp(−x− (a1 +N1 − 1)y1)− (N2 − 1) exp(−x−N1y1) + c ≥ 0 .
We consider the following possible cases.
3.2.1. Exit equilibria with x > 0, y1 > 0
This would require a solution to the following system of equations:
a2 exp(−a2x−N1y1) = c ,
(a1 +N1 − 1) exp(−x− (a1 +N1 − 1)y1) + (N2 − 1) exp(−x−N1y1) = c .
From the first equation we know that a2x+N1y1 = log
a2
c . To solve the system,
we substitute y in the second equation and obtain:
(a1 +N1 − 1) exp(− log
a2
c
− (1 − a2)x−
a1 − 1
N1
[log
a2
c
− a2x])
+ (N2 − 1) exp(− log
a2
c
− (1− a2)x) = c ,
which can be solved numerically.
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3.2.2. Exit equilibria with x = 0, y1 > 0
This would require:
a2 exp(−N1y1) ≤ c ,
(a1 +N1 − 1) exp(−(a1 +N1 − 1)y1) + (N2 − 1) exp(−N1y1) = c .
Note that from the equation above we can say:
exp(−N1y1) =
c− (a1 +N1 − 1) exp(−(a1 +N1 − 1)y1)
N2 − 1
≤ c ≤
c
a2
.
Therefore, this is always a possible equilibrium.
3.2.3. Exit equilibria with x > 0, y = 0
This requires that x = 1a2 log
a2
c , and that:
− (a1 +N1 − 1) exp(−x)− (N2 − 1) exp(−x) + c ≥ 0
⇔ (a1 +N − 2)(
c
a2
)
1
a2 ≤ c
⇔
a1 +N − 2
c
≤ (
a2
c
)
1
a2 .
The above holds when a2 is small (RHS is maximized at a2 = c exp(1)).
3.2.4. Exit equilibria with x = 0, y = 0
This case will never happen, as c < a2.
4. Exit equilibria of the weighted total effort model - single dominant
user
In this appendix, we solve for the socially optimal investment profile, and
identify the possible exit equilibria, and parameter conditions under which each
equilibrium is possible. It is easy to show that in a socially optimal investment
profile x∗, only user 1 will be exerting effort, so that:
x∗1 =
1
a
ln
aN
c
, x∗j = 0, ∀j = 2, . . . , N .
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We next find the exit equilibria under two different cases. First, if any non-
dominant user i 6= 1 steps out of the mechanism, user 1 will continue exerting
all effort, but at a lower level given by:
xˆi1 =
1
a
log
a(N − 1)
c
, xˆij = 0, ∀j = 2, . . . , N .
Next, if user 1 steps out of the mechanism, there are two possible exit equilibria:
if a > N − 1, there will be enough externality for users j 6= 1 to continue free-
riding, resulting in the following equilibrium investment levels:
xˆ11 =
1
a
log
a
c
, xˆ1j = 0, ∀j = 2, . . . , N .
However, when a < N − 1, user 1 will free-ride on the externality of other users’
investments, leading to the exit equilibrium:
xˆ11 = 0, xˆ
1
j =
1
N − 1
log
N − 1
c
, ∀j = 2, . . . , N .
5. BB and VP in exit equilibria - single dominant user
In this appendix, we look at the performance of the Pivotal and Externality
mechanisms, under the different exit equilibria identified in Section 4.4, sum-
marized in Table 2.
In the Externality mechanism, users’ taxes are given by:
tE1 (x
∗) = cx∗1(
1
N
− 1)
tEj (x
∗) =
c
N
x∗1, ∀j = 2, . . . , N .
For non-dominant users i ∈ {2, . . . , N} to voluntarily participate in the mecha-
nism, we require gi(xˆ
i) ≥ gi(x
∗, tEi (x
∗)):
c
a(N − 1)
≥
c
aN
+
c
aN
log
aN
c
⇔
1
N − 1
≥ logN + log
a
c
.
However, logN ≥ 1N−1 , ∀N ≥ 3, and a > c. Therefore, the voluntary participa-
tion constraints will always fail to hold in the Externality mechanism.
44
Finally, we analyze the total budget in the Pivotal mechanism for the current
scenario. The taxes for the non-dominant users i 6= 1 will be given by:
tPi = (N − 1)
c
aN
+ cx∗1 − (N − 1)
c
a(N − 1)
− cxˆi1 =
c
a
(log
N
N − 1
− 1) .
The taxes for user 1 will depend on the realized exit equilibrium. If a < N − 1,
this tax is given by:
tP1 = (N−1)
c
aN
−(N−1)
c
N − 1
−c(N−1)xˆ1j = (N−1)
c
aN
−c(1+log
N − 1
c
) .
The sum of the Pivotal taxes under this parameter conditions will then be given
by:
∑
i
tPi = c
(
N − 1
a
(
log
N
N − 1
− 1 +
1
N
)
−
(
1 + log
N − 1
c
))
Note that log z − 1z < 0, ∀z <
3
2 , and therefore, with N ≥ 3, the above sum is
always negative. We conclude that the Pivotal mechanism will always carry a
deficit.
On the other hand, when a > N − 1, the tax for the dominant user is given
by:
tP1 = (N − 1)
c
aN
− (N − 1)
c
a
= (N − 1)
c
a
(
1
N
− 1) .
The sum of the Pivotal taxes will then be given by:
∑
i
tPi =
c(N − 1)
a
(
−1 + log
N
N − 1
− 1 +
1
N
)
By the same argument as before, the above sum will always be negative, indi-
cating a budget deficit in the Pivotal mechanism under this scenario as well.
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